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Military-ﬁrst politics has been at the heart of the unexpected regime stability in North
Korea under Kim Jong-il and his son Jong-un. This article analyzes Kim Jong-il’s military-
ﬁrst politics as a strategic choice for regime survival, in which the locus of political power
switched from the party to the military. At the same time, Kim Jong-il formulated a
complex system of circumventing the possibility of the armed forces’ political domination,
including personalistic control using sticks and carrots, fortifying security and surveillance
institutions, and compartmentalizing the security institutions for intra- and inter-
organizational checks and balances to prevent the emergence of organized opposition to
the regime. Although an effective short-term solution, military-ﬁrst politics could never be
a long-term strategy for building gangseongdaeguk (a powerful and prosperous nation).
The current Kim Jong-un regime needs to conduct sweeping reforms to address dire
economic difﬁculties, which might result in a departure from his father’s legacy and
downgrade the military’s power. In this process, the current regime’s (in)stability will
depend on how it maintains a balance between revoking military-ﬁrst politics and pre-
serving the armed forces’ allegiance.
 2014 The Regents of the University of California. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights
reserved.1. Introduction
To date, the power succession from Kim Jong-il to his son Jong-un has appeared to be stable with no sign of imminent
regime crisisdat least on the surface. Kim Jong-un has taken over political leadership in the military, the party, and the
cabinet, exercising control over domestic, foreign, and military affairs. Since Kim Jong-il died on December 17, 2011, his son’s
succession has been sweeping and peremptory: Kim Jong-un became supreme commander of the Korean People’s Army
(KPA) on December 30, 2011, was appointed as the ﬁrst secretary of the Korean Workers Party (KWP) on April 11, 2012, and
two days later was designated as the chairman of the National Defense Commission (NDC). He consolidated his grip on the
political leadership in Pyongyang when he rose to the rank of marshal of the KPA (Jung, 2012).
The unexpected stability in North Koreamakesmanydincluding scholars and policy-makersdwonder how the dictatorial
regime has managed to survive multifarious challenges from both domestic and international arenas. Since the 1990s, many
observers speculated that the post-Kim Il-sung North Koreawould not survive such challenges; today, Kim Jong-il’s death has
spawned the same speculation that the Kim Jong-un regime may soon collapse (Bennett and Lind, 2011; Byman and Lind,
2010; Snyder, 2010; Stares and Wit, 2009; Oh and Hassig, 1999). Such speculation is not without intuitive insight as most
dictatorial regimes do not have a clearly established rule of succession. Furthermore, considering that the new leader in
Pyongyang does not have a prominent political career or rightful entitlement to rule (except that he was anointed by his
father), the country is likely to become embroiled in such a power struggle after the dictator dies or is dethroned.f California. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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a signiﬁcant power shift from the party to the military occurred; equally important are the ways in which Kim managed to
control top brass in the KPA. Considering that an organized anti-regimemovement from below is a distant possibility in North
Korea, the armed forcesdif sowillingdmight be the only institutionwith the physical ability to overthrow the dictator. Under
Kim Jong-il, the KPA became a highly politicized institution; it was no longer limited to the mission of national defense, but
also assumed non-military-related missions, such as acting as guardian of the regime. Due to the KPA’s power and political
roles, the Kim regime desperately needed both “protection by the military” and “protection from the military” (Feaver, 1996,
p. 154). In other words, Kim Jong-il wanted a strong military that could guarantee both the state and the regime security, but
he was simultaneously pressured to design a system to control the KPA. Kim Jong-il’s legacy of military-ﬁrst politics still
governs North Korea and, thus, this study will furnish a better understanding of the present and future of the Pyongyang
regime’s political (in)stability and policy directions.
Broadly speaking, previous studies of Kim Jong-il’s military-ﬁrst politics have revolved around three venues. The ﬁrst is an
analysis of the ideological characteristics of military-ﬁrst politics in relation to Kim Il-sung’s ideology of Juche (self-reliance).
Scholars focus on the ideological narratives that the slogan aims to achievednamely, controlling the people and building
gangseongdaeguk (a powerful and prosperous nation)dand whether the discourse is a continuation of Juche or a completely
different brand of propaganda (Jeon, 2009; Byman and Lind, 2010). Second, some examine structural and institutional
transformation of the Pyongyang regime, especially the interactivedand sometimes conﬂictingdrelationship among the
party, the cabinet, and the military. Some analyses suggest that Kim Jong-il’s launch of military-ﬁrst politics brought sig-
niﬁcant changes to the power structure inwhich themilitary rose to become a dominant decision-maker at the expense of the
party’s power and prestige (Kim, 2006; Kim, 2006; McEachern, 2010); others contend that the political system is still intact as
the KWP remains the political organ with the highest authority and the KPA is under the party’s guidance and control (Lee,
2003). The institutional approach also analyzes Kim’s political maneuvering to control themilitary (Jeon, 2000; Scobell, 2006;
Gause, 2006). Finally, scholars have explored the domestic and foreign policy effects of Kim Jong-il’s military-ﬁrst politics
(Suh, 2002; McEachern, 2009; Kim, 2010).
This article adopts an institutional perspective to examine major shifts in the political power structure and the military
control mechanisms Kim Jong-il exercised, which will provide insight into post-Kim Jong-il’s North Korean politics. This
article suggests that military-ﬁrst politics was adopted as a strategic choice to overcome serious threats to the survival of the
state and the regime. The Kim regime demoted the KWP’s power and prestige to overcome the party’s sheer incompetence in
dealing with challenges the country faced at the turn of the 1990s and potential challenges from senior party elites to Kim’s
political authority. The consequence was a power shift from the KWP to the KPA. At the same time, Kim made every effort to
prevent the KPA from threatening his position by devising a complex and sophisticated web of personal loyalties and
institutional checks and balances. As a result, although the KPA emerged as the most powerful governing organ under
military-ﬁrst politics, Kim Jong-il was able to control the armed forces so that a coup became a distant possibility.
This article is structured along the following themes. It ﬁrst discusses international and domestic contexts in which Kim
Jong-il embarked on military-ﬁrst politics and the strategic aims he hankered to achieve. Second, it outlines major changes in
the political power structure in Pyongyang: the dwindling inﬂuence of the KWP and the growing power of the KPA. Third, the
article details Kim Jong-il’s military control mechanismsdboth personal and institutional designsdto preclude the military’s
threat to his leadership. The article concludes with speculation on political inheritancesdboth beneﬁts and burdensdthat
have been passed to the Kim Jong-un regime.
2. Military-ﬁrst politics: structural contexts and strategic choices
2.1. Challenges to the party-state
The deﬁning characteristic of North Korea under Kim Jong-il was seongun jeohgchi (military-ﬁrst politics), in which the
ultimate aim was to build a gangseongdaeguk (a powerful and prosperous nation). These catchwords signiﬁed security and
economic problems that threatened the survival of the regime. Kim Jong-il’s military-ﬁrst politics can be understood in the
context of the international structural changes that occurred at the end of the Cold War and the accompanying domestic
problems. Dire challenges to the regime came from three quarters: the collapse of the regimes in the Soviet Union and Eastern
Europe, natural disasters and famine, and Kim Il-sung’s death.
With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, North Korea lost its biggest security and economic benefactor. Until the end
of the 1980s, the Soviet Union, as North Korea’s largest trade partner, furnished the country with one-sided trade that
amounted to $3.5 billion per year (McEachern, 2010, p. 67). However, this amount plummeted at the turn of the 1990s when
both the Soviet Union and China demanded that North Korea use hard currency for trade. In the famine that struck North
Korea, approximately ﬁve percent of the population perished. Although frequent droughts and ﬂoods in the 1990s hit the
country’s already fragile economy and resulted in famine, North Korea already had much more serious structural ills that
came from the state-controlled socialist model of economy and the loss of opportunities for reform (Haggard and Noland,
2009, p. 4). The economic hardship threatened the Pyongyang regime when the state could not continue to provide food
and other necessities to its people (probably the only rationale for dictatorial rule). As a result, massive defections occurred.
The worst disaster came when Kim Il-sung died in 1994, creating a power vacuum. Despite being a brutal dictator who
purged numerous potential rivals and political opponents, Kim Il-sung enjoyed the “unquestionable acceptance of authority”
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his rule through the gloriﬁcation and mystiﬁcation of his leadership in anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare in the 1930s and 1940s
and through self-deiﬁcation; he indoctrinated his people with the “Ten Principles for the Establishment of the Juche Idea,”
which required absolute loyalty to the revolutionary party and, speciﬁcally, to the leader. Kim Il-sung was revered by North
Koreans as the founder of the nation and of the Juche ideology. When he died, there was a loyalty vacuum that could not be
ﬁlled, as no one could compare to the “dear leader.”
Faced with multifarious challenges to the regime’s survival, the KWP as the highest political organ of the state proved
incompetent; the party itself was plagued with bureaucratic indolence, arrogance, and rampant corruption. With the collapse
of the former communist regimes, communism as a utopian political ideology lost its charm. The KWP as the vanguard of Kim
Il-sung’s Juche ideology failed to win popular loyalty; instead, the party organ continued to rely on the suppression of in-
formation and communication as outside information streamed into its people. There was a growing discrepancy between
the party’s propaganda for a utopian society and popular disenchantment. The KWP’s inability to govern became evident as
the economy continued to deteriorate into the mid-1990s and the party’s control over its people slackened during the
gonaneui haenggun (arduous march). Kim Jong-il certainly realized that the party was unable to offer remedies to the
country’s troubles; the mere attempt to revamp party organizations or reshufﬂe senior leadership positions would not solve
the problems.
Another reason for Kim Jong-il’s relegation of the party and reliance on the KPA stemmed from his own conviction that the
communist regimes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe collapsed not because of their economic difﬁculties, but because
of their “failure to establish and maintain a ﬁrm ideology to manage their societies” (Jeon, 2009, p. 183). Kim Jong-il
emphasized that “socialist countries have collapsed, with no shots ﬁred, because they did not have strong troops. There
will be no people, no socialist country, and no communist party if they do not have a strong army at a time when they are
constructing a socialist society under siege and threat of imperialists” (Kim,1999, p. 267). Certainly, Kim Jong-il’s military-ﬁrst
politics derived from the lessons on regime survival learned from the experience of the former communist regimes.
Still, amore deep-seated reason for Kim Jong-il’s decision to demote the KWP and alignwith the KPAwas that he lacked his
father’s leadership qualities and charisma. Kim Jong-il did not possess his father’s credentials as a revolutionary. He never
fought a guerrilla war for independence, did not invent a governing ideology, and was not even a good speaker. One of Kim
Jong-il’s most cherished political priorities was to enforce party discipline through the Organization and Guidance Depart-
ment of the KWP, “the party within the party” that was responsible for the appointment of high-ranking party cadres,
ideological instruction, and inspection of other state apparatuses (Jeon, 2009, p. 89). Kim Jong-il’s efforts to enforce discipline
and competence in the party only met with declining efﬁciency of the pivotal political organ by the end of the 1980s. In sum,
Kim Jong-il’s military-ﬁrst politics emerged in the contexts of internal and external problems that the KWP proved incapable
of solving.
2.2. Power shift from the party to the military
The ascendance of the KPA under military-ﬁrst politics was a clear deviation from the orthodox Leninist party system
found in traditional totalitarian regimes. In a communist regime, the party as the vanguard of the proletariat commands the
highest authority; the party envisions the state ideology, controls the lives of government ofﬁcials and ordinary citizens, and
formulates government policy. Supposedly, the partywill maintain unity through its leadership of the Politburo that is elected
by the Central Committee, which in turn is elected by the Party Congress, while local party cells elect Party Congress members
(Scobell, 2006, p. 18). Ideally, the party administers the organs that represent the proletariat and fulﬁll the revolutionary
mission. In North Korea, the party’s authority is identiﬁed with suryong (dear leader), that merely carries out suryong’s
instructions.
Kim Jong-il’s military-ﬁrst politics clearly shifted the locus of power and authority from the party to the military, such that
North Korea’s political system was no longer a party-state. The question is how much of a power shift occurred under Kim
Jong-il. Some suggest that the North Korean political system is still intact as the party remains the highest political authority
that enforces the dear leader’s will. The 1998 constitution, which codiﬁed the military’s vital role in the country, stipulates
that all state activities must be conducted under the leadership of the KWP; this was reafﬁrmed in the 2010 constitution. The
KWPdwith approximately three million membersdstill exerts enormous inﬂuence over elites and citizens: “[W]ith the
regime’s demise, they would lose their power [and] privilege, and hence be unable to provide for their families” (Scobell,
2006, p. 22). In civil-military relations, the military was still the party’s army and effectively controlled by the party
through its instruments, such as the Politburo and the Military Committee, the inﬁltration of party organizations in the
military, and political commissars’ indoctrination of army ofﬁcers. As a result, the KPA did not supersede the political au-
thority of the KWP; themilitary was politicized simply to enforce the party’s will. According to this view, military-ﬁrst politics
was nothing new to the system because it did not replace the party-state structure, but rather strengthened the system
through military means (Lee, 2003, p. 89).
An opposing interpretation of military-ﬁrst politics suggests that Kim Jong-il transformed the country from a party-state
to a military-dominant regime. According to this view, military-ﬁrst politics switched the locus of power from the party to the
military so that the latter directed the former: “[T]he military is so powerful that it is above the state. The military has now
become the supreme commander of the state, the party, and society, turning North Korea into a military garrison state” (Kim,
2006, p. 65). Military-ﬁrst politics resulted in the institutional autonomy of the military from the party and the “institutional
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nation’s spirit and morale (Kim, 2006, p. 81). This view suggests that Kim Jong-il’s political status, and especially his control
over the military, were tenuous at best; therefore, he had to elevate the power and prestige of the KPA as a means of con-
trolling it and consolidating his leadership.
Apparently, neither of the views fully reﬂects the nature of military-ﬁrst politics under Kim Jong-il. The ﬁrst interpretation
does not explain the major changes that have occurred in North Korean politics since the mid-1990s. The constitutional or
institutional design of the party’s supremacy over other state apparatuses may not accurately reﬂect the ways in which
political power is exercised. This point is crucially relevant to North Korea as Kim Jong-il’s personal predilections in ruling
could easily bypass the constitutional design. At the same time, the opposite interpretation of military-ﬁrst politics also
deforms the reality of North Korean politics in that, at the time of his father’s death, Kim Jong-il was already ﬁrmly controlling
the KPA. The power succession to Kim Jong-il was formalized at the Sixth Congress of the KWP in October 1980. In May 1990,
he was elected ﬁrst vice chairman of the National Defense Commission and, in December 1991, to the post of Supreme
Commander of the KPA. In 1992, he rose to the rank of marshal of the KPA; in April 1993, he was elected chairman of the
National Defense Commission. Consequently, when Kim Il-sung died, there was virtually no possibility of power struggle as
Kim Jong-il was the apparent successor and ﬁrmly controlled all governmental organs.
Therefore, rather than over-(or under)estimate the political consequence of military-ﬁrst politics, it is more worthwhile to
focus on the political objectives that Kim Jong-il tried to achieve and, in this context, the KPA’s power and role in North Korean
politics. At the expense of the KWP’s power and prestige, Kim Jong-il mobilized the KPA beyond its traditional role of national
defense and expanded into the social, economic, and political areas. However, the expansion of the military’s role did not
translate into building the KPA’s political power to the point that ofﬁcers acquired the ability to veto important decisions. Kim
Jong-il’s primary objective with military-ﬁrst politics was to safeguard his political leadership in the face of domestic and
foreign security challenges. As a result, Kim’s control over the military was tight as the military’s subordination to its master
became ever more resolute.
2.3. KPA’s political roles under Kim Jong-il
The KPA’s role expansion into non-military areas under military-ﬁrst politics was not a new phenomenon; high-ranking
ofﬁcers had also been party elites. The expansion of the military’s role is traceable to the 1960s, when Kim Il-sung launched
the 4-dae gunsanoseon (four-fold military line) that comprised “(1) arming the entire nation, (2) training all KPA soldiers to
assume higher responsibilities than their rank and position would dictate, (3) turning the entire country into a fortress, and
(4) modernizing the KPA” (Koh, 2005). From the early years of state-building, the KPA’s roles were extensive in the political
systems (especially in the party and the cabinet), economic development, and mobilization of the civilian population for
political indoctrination and military training.
However, the 1960s were also when the KWP institutionalized its control over the KPA. After eliminating different factions
(especially the Soviet Koreans and the Yanan faction), the KWP installed the party committee at all levels of the KPA in 1958 so
that political ofﬁcers shared commandership with commanding ofﬁcers to maintain the party’s supervision over the ofﬁcer
corps. Furthermore, the party also instituted theMilitary Committee in the KWP’s Central Committee. The Rules of the Korean
Workers Party, revised in each of the Fourth (1961) through Sixth (1980) Congresses, stipulated that the KWP Central
Committee reserved the right to organize the revolutionary forces (Article 23) and to lead the country’s military forces and
defense industries (Article 27). The 1980 version of the Rules of the KWP dedicated all of Chapter Seven to explaining the
party’s control over the KPA. Likewise, the party rules made it impossible for top brass to be outside the control of or to
supersede the authority of the party (Korean Worker’s Party, 1981). The party’s control over the military was consolidated in
1969 under the political commissar system, in which political commissars were employed at the corps through regiment
levels and political guiding ofﬁcers at the lower military units. These commissars were recruited from high-ranking party
cadres and shared leadership with military commanders by cosigning on all military decisions (Lee, 2003, p. 155e168). After
Kim Jong-il was ofﬁcially introduced as the successor to his father at the Sixth Party Congress in 1980, he strengthened the
party’s control over the KPA by reinforcing the party’s ideological discipline in the military through his leadership of the
Organization and Guidance Department of the KWP. Until Kim Il-Sung’s death, the party and the military were interwoven as
high-ranking ofﬁcers were party elites and party members also penetrated the military through the political commissar
system, which in turn reinforced the KWP’s control over the KPA.
Such partyearmy relations drastically changed after Kim Jong-il assumed political leadership and launched military-ﬁrst
politics in the 1990s. Although the KPA had been the party’s army, military-ﬁrst politics separated the two institutions, and
the KPA was now the people’s army and the guardian of the Kim Jong-il regime. The institutional separation freed the KPA
from the KWP’s supervision and made the military not only the defender of the nation, but also the ideological vanguard that
sustained the nation’s highest spirit and morale. Although military-ﬁrst politics ofﬁcially launched in 1997, Kim Jong-il’s
desire to mobilize the KPA forces for non-security-related purposes emerged earlier in the decade. In 1991, Kim insisted that
the country “needs to value the military. the state will collapse if it does not honor the military. the party organs should
put priority on taking care of the problems in military-related industries” (Kim,1999, p. 24). He reiterated the military’s role a
year later: “[T]he party can be protected and prosper only when there is a strong military. Accomplishing the Juche revolu-
tionary mission ﬁrst and foremost requires the strengthening of the military” (Kim, 1999, p. 6e7). Military-ﬁrst politics
became state ideology in March 1997, when Kim Jong-il delivered his speech at the KWP Central Committee, declaring that
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military’s revolutionary fervor (Jeon, 2009, p. 190).
Kim Jong-il’s employment of military-ﬁrst politics put the KPA at the forefront of his power, which elevated the military’s
prestige and political inﬂuence vis-à-vis the party. At the institutional level, military-ﬁrst politics separated the military from
the party and resulted in the latter’s loss of control over the former. The KPA’s institutional autonomy enabled Kim Jong-il not
only to use themilitary in times of national crisis, but also to safeguard his political power by ruling the party and the military
separately. The power shift from the party to the army was manifested in the 1998 constitutional revision, which removed
two state apparatusesdthe state’s president and vice president and the Central People’s Committeedand elevated the
National Defense Commission to the highest state institution to orchestrate national security and economic policies
(Mansourov, 2006, p. 45).
Military-ﬁrst policies were also apparent in several governing schemes, including Kim’s focus on frequent visits to military
bases and military industries for his “guidance inspection” activities, massive increases in defense spending at a time of
economic distress, and empowerment of the National Defense Commission. In 1994, Kim Jong-il made only one military-
related trip out of 21 guidance visits. However, between 1995 and 2006, more than 50 percent of these guidance in-
spections were related to the military and defense-related facilities, although the number slightly decreased after his stroke
and ensuing serious health problems in 2007 (Jung, 2011, p. 127). Kim’s reliance on the military was plainly expressed in his
1996 address at the 50th anniversary of the Kim Il-sung University, when he insisted that he “frequently perform[ed] guidance
inspections on the military because, in today’s complex political situation, it is of the utmost importance to strengthen the
armed forces.” (Jung, 2011, p. 129).
The growing political inﬂuence of the top brass in the armed forces was reﬂected in the top echelons of the government
that accompanied Kim Jong-il’s guidance inspections. Key escorts for the guidance tours most often included Oh Jin-u,
marshal and minister of the KPA (died in 1995), Choe Gwang, marshal and chief of general staff (died in 1997), Jo Moung-
rok, vice marshal, ﬁrst vice chairman of the NDC (died in 2010), and Kim Yong-chun, vice marshal and vice chairman of
the NDC, among the older echelons of the KPA; as well as Kim Il-cheol, vice marshal, minister of the KPA, Yi Myong-su, di-
rector of the General Staff’s Operations Bureau, and Pak Jae-kyong, deputy director of General Political Bureau, among the
relatively new class of the KPA leadership (Gause, 2006, p. 7e11). In contrast, party ofﬁcials’ inﬂuence in the Kim Jong-il
regime became marginalized, as several were removed from their posts or retired their seats passed to KPA ofﬁcers.
The growing inﬂuence of the KPA under Kim Jong-il was also reﬂected in the country’s defense spending. North Korea’s
ofﬁcial defense budget revealed a modest increase during the Kim Jong-il era, accounting for 11.4 percent of all government
spending in 1994 and 14.6 percent in 1998 when Kim Jong-il formally embraced military-ﬁrst politics. However, the numbers
drastically change when one looks at other sources. For example, the Ministry of National Defense in South Korea estimates
defense spending in North Korea to be above 50 percent throughout Kim Jong-il’s rule (Moon and Lee, 2009, p. 88). Despite
the wide variations in the sources, Kim Jong-il clearly gave the KPA priority in allocating scant domestic resources during and
after the arduous march period.
Another noticeable change in military-ﬁrst politics was the strengthening of the National Defense Commission. The NDC
was not identical to the KPA; it included a small number of senior leaders under Kim Jong-il. The NDC was ﬁrst mentioned in
the 1972 constitution and was one of several sub-committees of the Central People’s Committee. The president was
concurrently chairman of the NDC, which indicated that the power of the NDC chair was meaningless without him. The NDC
became independent in 1990, when Kim Jong-il was appointed as vice chairman (Lee, 2003, p.186). Such changewas reﬂected
in the 1992 constitution, which declared that the chairman of the NDC would be the second most powerful leader in North
Korea, after Juseok (the president). Meanwhile, the 1998 constitution permanently removed the Juseok system, vacating the
presidency forever and naming Kim Il-sung as the “eternal president.” Kim Jong-il was elected chairman of the NDC in 1992
and reelected in 1998 with the new constitution. Although the 1992 constitution allocated the NDC chair’s power only over
the military, the 1998 constitution extended the chair’s power over all armed forces and defense-related matters. The Rodong
newspaper (1998) succinctly delineated the NDC chair’s power when it stated that the chair of the NDC “is the supreme leader
of the nation who reins the nation’s entire political, military, and economic affairs and defends the socialist state and its
people.” The new constitution stated thatthe Chairman of the National Defense Commission . is the supreme leader of the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea . directs affairs of the State, personally guides the work of the National Defense Commission, appoints or
removes key cadres in the ﬁeld of national defense. and declares a state of emergency, a state of war andmobilization
order within the country (Information Center on North Korea, 2010).Kim Jong-il mobilized the armed forces to survive the multifaceted challenges to his regime and consolidate his political
power by counterbalancing the power of the party. In this process, the military emerged as the most inﬂuential governing
body in North Korea. The puzzle is, if the KPA rose to prominence at the expense of the once preeminent KWP in post-Kim Il-
sung’s North Korea, how inﬂuential did the military become during and after the Kim Jong-il regime? Has the KPA risen to
become a political organ powerful enough to surpass other institutions and regulate the country’s policy agendas, especially
economic reform and foreign policy? Contrary to the widespread perception that the KPA essentially controlled Pyongyang’s
policy directions, this article suggests that the armed forces’ political power was still limited. This point becomes evident
when one consciously draws the distinction between the expansion of themilitary’s role into different non-security areas and
its actual exercise of political power. As previously discussed, the KPA’s expansion into socio-economic spheres was already
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The same could be said of the KPA’s expansion under military-ﬁrst politics but, this time, not by the party machine but by Kim
Jong-il’s personal military control schemes. To gauge the armed forces’ political inﬂuence in North Korea accurately, one
needs to examine the sophisticated military control mechanisms that Kim Jong-il employed.3. Kim Jong-il’s military control mechanisms
Kim Jong-il consolidated his power by separating the military from the party and elevating the power and prestige of the
former while demoting the latter. At the same time, Kim’s political priority was to secure tight control over top brass in the
army. This time, however, instead of using the party machine, Kim Jong-il asserted personalistic control over the military by
fabricating a complex system of military control instruments, which can be grouped into three maneuvers: (1) controlling the
top echelons of the army by granting “carrots” to devotees and using “sticks” on dissenters; (2) reinforcing the army units
responsible for regime security; and (3) creating a complex system of checks and balances within and among key military
units. Ensuring the KPA’s absolute loyalty through personal and institutional cooptation was the key to the survival of Kim
Jong-il’s regime.3.1. Carrots and sticks: personalistic control of the military
More often than not, a dictatorship’s survival is based on political support not from the people but from a small number of
key elite groups that support the regime. A dictator will provide goods to members of the inner circle in the form of political
power and prestige (but not necessarily powerful), material beneﬁts (such as luxury goods, cozy housing, vacations, and
lucrative industries), and commendations (medals and public accolades) (Mesquita et al., 2003). Such favors were crucial to
the Pyongyang regime’s survival, in which the people suffered from economic hardships for decades, making the provision of
goods to the masses simply unfeasible. Equally important was the ruthlessly efﬁcient suppression of any organized challenge
to the dictator’s authority.
Upon his succession, Kim Jong-il consolidated his political power base by fashioning a core stratum of new elites from the
military, while making sure not to alienate the aging revolutionaries. Kim’s military-ﬁrst politics did not immediately isolate
or eliminate the aging revolutionaries who had waged the anti-Japanese guerrilla war and later governed North Korea as
principal followers of Kim Il-sung; he kept them in their positions until they retired or died. When they died, Kim kept the
posts temporarily vacant in their honor. For example, when the venerable Oh Jin-u (one of the core members of the Kim Il-
sung regime from the partisan guerrilla era and the second most powerful elite after Kim Il-sung’s death) died in 1995, Kim
Jong-il left his post as minister of the KPA vacant for more than seven months until appointing Choe Gwang, general chief of
staff of the KPA, to ﬁll it. When Choe died two years later, the position was again left vacant until 1998, when Kim Il-cheol,
commander of the Korean People’s Navy, succeeded him. Kim Jong-il did not need to alienate his father’s supporters; they
simply occupied honorary posts (Jeon, 2000, p. 766e767).
Such inclusive politics were possible due to Kim Jong-il’s crafty design of a dual-power system in the cabinet and the
military, in which the highest-ranking leader kept nominal leadership while a number-two (or number-three) ofﬁcer usually
wielded the real power. Kim Jong-il received reports from, and gave orders directly to, the second- or third-highest ofﬁcers so
that the top brass maintained a system of checks and balances within the hierarchy. Because of this, the ofﬁcial hierarchy and
rankings did not accurately reﬂect power relations in the system; the top leaders who showed up at state ceremonies might
not have necessarily been the actual power brokers in North Korea. For example, Kim Yong-nam, chairman of the party’s
Standing Committee, and Baek Nam-sun, foreign minister, were the head of state and minister, respectively, but each per-
formed only ritual activities such as delivering ceremonial speeches and accepting foreign diplomats. In contrast, Kang Seok-
ju, a lower ranking ofﬁcial as ﬁrst vice foreign minister, was one of the key inner circle members of the Kim regime and
wielded real decision-making power in important foreign policy areas (Kim, 2006, p. 103).
Kim Jong-il safeguarded unwavering allegiance from the top brass in the army with extravagant rewards, including
massive promotions and luxury goods. After being elected to the post of supreme commander of the KPA in 1992, Kim Jong-il
conferred generous promotions onmilitary ofﬁcers; about 1200 general grade ofﬁcers were promoted during the 1990s (Kim,
2009, p.178). As the ﬁrst generation of old revolutionary ofﬁcers died or retired, Kim Jong-il replaced themwith generals from
his alma mater, the Mankyungdae Revolutionary Institute, or with ofﬁcers who had studied in Moscow or Eastern Europe in
the 1960s and 1970s. During the mourning period of 1994e1997, about 50 Kim Il-sung era generals died, and were replaced
with handpicked junior ofﬁcers whose allegiance to him was beyond question. As a result, Kim Jong-il completed the
generational changes from his father’s inner circle to his own in both the military and the party.
While conferring material beneﬁts and promotions upon members of his inner circle, Kim Jong-il also resorted to purges
and harsh punishments for those whose allegiance was uncertain. As a way to control the people, the Kim Il-sung regime had
devised a class system, the songbun (or class), composed of three groups: (1) the “core” class included those who fought the
anti-Japanese guerrilla war or war with South Korea and turned into high-ranking KWP cadres, (2) the “wavering” class
included the majority, and (3) the “hostile” class included landowners, traditional elites, priests, lawyers, doctors, merchants,
and Japanese collaborators. The class systemwas ofﬁcially adopted in 1957 by the Politburo of the KWP as a tool for massive
purges and tight social control, but continued to classify all North Korean people, although its inﬂuence diminished through
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between people of the same or similar songbun” (Lankov, 2012).
Kim Jong-il’s favoritism also shaped his treatment of the people around him. The core selectorates whom he trusted
received foreign luxury goods as generous gifts, including cars, watches, stereos, and televisionsdthe so-called Kim Jong-il’s
grandiose politics. At the same time, he purged about 600 ofﬁcers after he discovered a coup attempt in 1992. About a dozen
army generals whowere educated in Moscow and inﬂuenced by Gorbachev’s perestroika planned to assassinate the two Kims
and implement radical socio-economic reforms in North Korea. However, the plot was discovered and the generals were
executed.
Another coup attempt occurred in 1995, this time by the Sixth Army Corps stationed in North Hamkyung province and
possibly supported by the neighboring Seventh Army Corps, which planned to march to Pyongyang. However, the plot was
also stopped by the Sixth Corps commander, Kim Yong-chun, who was later rewarded with promotion to general staff of the
KPA. After this failed coup, Kim Jong-il dissolved the Sixth Corps (McEachern, 2010, p. 88).
Even after the two coup attempts, there were frequent rumors of dissention in the military; General Yi Bong-won, deputy
head of the KPA’s General Political Bureau, and Suh Gwan-hui, agriculture secretary, were reportedly executed in 1997. One
year later, Kim Yong-ryong, deputy head of the State Security Agency, was purged for having made critical remarks about the
Kim regime and called for reform (Sano, 2005). As much as Kim Jong-il relied on the military for his political power, his
suspicion of the KPA’s allegiance and the possibility of a coup d’état urged him to design personalistic control mechanisms
over the top echelons in the party and the army.
3.2. Coup-prooﬁng: security institutions and institutional checks
The KPA’s ascendancy under military-ﬁrst politics was accompanied by the strengthening of security agencies and army
units that were responsible for Kim Jong-il’s regime security. The Pyongyang regime had multiple security agencies that
served for regime security, such as the State Security Department (SSD) under the direct control of Kim Jong-il (and the NDC)
and theMinistry of People’s Security (MPS) under the cabinet’s control. Furthermore, the Kim Jong-il regimewas protected by
multiple military units that were in charge of the security of Kim Jong-il himself and the defense of the capital city: the Guard
Command under the Ministry of People’s Armed Forces (MPAF), the Pyongyang Defense Command, and the Military Security
Command. The presence of multiple all-powerful security institutions is commonplace in any police state that relies on
physical and psychological terror to govern, but North Korea under Kim Jong-il was an unusually extreme case, with unusually
tight surveillance over its people and the core members of the regime.
The SSD, with approximately 50,000 to 70,000 personnel, is the most powerful secret police agency in North Korea,
conducting policing missions from provinces down to inminban (people’s group) and companies with more than 1000
workers. Kim Jong-il directly controlled the SSD when the director position became vacant after director Yi Jin-su died in the
1980s. The SSD’s Special Mission Group, whose 15 members were appointed by Kim Jong-il, directly reported to Kim its
responsibilities over “surveillance and ideological investigations of high-ranking ofﬁcials within the KWP, the SSD, the
Cabinet, and Ministry of People’s Armed Forces” (Gause, 2012, p. 25). Another virtually omnipotent security institution is the
MPS (previously the Department of Public Security), which is in charge of maintaining law and order, investigating criminal
cases and non-political prisoners, and protecting key governmental facilities. However, with more than 200,000 personnel,
the MPS’ role extended to surveillance of public ofﬁcials in the government as well as military ofﬁcers to verify political
allegiance to Kim Jong-il. Of special importance was the Korean People’s Internal Security Force (previously the Korean
People’s Security Force) within the MPS, which was in charge of controlling social unrest and rebellion. The third security
institution was the Military Security Command (MSC), which was responsible for preventing coup attempts by monitoring
and investigating high-ranking army ofﬁcers for corruption, political crimes, and disloyalty. The MSC, relatively small at about
10,000 personnel, was under the direct control of the NDC and Kim Jong-il through the MPAF.
Standing above all of these security institutions is the National Defense Commission, chaired by Kim Jong-il. In addition to
strengthening the NDC’s power and role, Kim Jong-il staffed the institution with military elites who were in charge of the
abovementioned security institutions. For example, of 13 NDC members elected after the 12th Supreme People’s Assembly
meeting, four were cross-listed with the Commission for Military Affairs of the Central Committee of the KWP: Kim Jong-il,
ChoMyong-rok (vice marshal and vice chairman of the NDC), Kim Yong-chun (vice marshal andminister of the KPA), and Kim
Il-cheol (vice marshal until 2010). Furthermore, the NDC members included U Dong-chuk (vice director of the State Security
Department) and Jang Sung-taek (chief of the Central Administrative Department of the KWP) (Jung, 2011; pp. 350e351).
The NDC’s ability to control the armed forces, security institutions, and entire society was greatly expanded during the
ﬁnal years of Kim Jong-il’s rule. Of particular note was Jang Sung-taek, who was purged in 2004 but subsequently emerged at
the top of the power hierarchy. He was elected to the NDC in 2009 and became vice chairman one year later; he was believed
to have played vital roles in the transition of power from Kim Jong-il to Jong-un.
Inasmuch as Kim Jong-il empowered the aforementioned security institutions, he astutely invented a system of checks and
balances among those security organizations to preclude coup attempts or other challenges to his authority. He compart-
mentalized the security institutions so that there would be no possibility of inter-organizational collusion. In general, North
Korea’s political systems under Kim Il-sung emphasized inter-departmental coordination for institutional efﬁciency so that
one ofﬁcial often held two or more positions in multiple state agencies. However, Kim Jong-il reorganized the governmental
structure in such a way that inter-departmental coordination was difﬁcult, thereby facilitating inter-agency competition
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nation and, in this context, ofﬁcials became preoccupied with their own bureaucratic interests and political survival.
Meanwhile, Kim Jong-il monopolized political power, and inter-agency coordination was possible only through him.
Such inter-departmental checks and balances were ever more prevalent in security and military organizations. For
instance, the SSD had maintained an inimical relationship with the KPA since 1976, when Kim Il-sung used the SSD to purge
KPA ofﬁcers who opposed his power succession to his son. The SSD also uncovered a coup attempt in 1992, leading to a purge
of 600 KPA ofﬁcers (McEachern, 2010, p. 94). At the same time, Kim Jong-il checked the seemingly invincible SSD by con-
trolling other security organizations from the KPA, including the Guard Command (GC) under the supervision of the KPA and
the Ministry of People’s Armed Forces. The GC was a counterbalance to the SSD as well as the KPA, safeguarding the Kim
regime. Meanwhile, the MPS counterbalanced the SSD and the GC. Supposedly, the cabinet supervised the MPS but, in reality,
the cabinet was controlled directly by the NDC and Kim Jong-il. Originally, the MPS had been amere cabinet agency, but it has
recently been promoted to the ministry level, comparable to the MPAF and the SSD.
4. Implications for the post-Kim Jong-il era
The Kim Jong-il regime unexpectedly withstood multiple challenges to its survival. As this article has suggested, at the
heart of Kim Jong-il’s regime survival was his mobilization of the KPA as a governing tool through hismilitary-ﬁrst politics and
his concomitant maneuvers to control the military. By mobilizing the KPA, Kim Jong-il circumvented the power and prestige
of the KWP and possible popular uprisings. At the same time, he invented a sophisticated system in which he controlled the
powerful armed forces through personalistic control over military ofﬁcers with carrots and sticks, a ﬁrm grip on security
institutions and the invention of intra- and inter-institutional competition so that no single organization could emerge to
threaten the regime’s security.
What was the legacy of Kim Jong-il’s military-ﬁrst politics? Undoubtedly, Kim Jong-un has inherited both beneﬁts and
burdens from his father. The accession to power for such a young and politically inexperienced son would not have been
possible without his father’s strong grip on the state and especially the military. To date, no dissenting political movements or
coup attempts have surfaced in Pyongyang, which attests to the KPA’s inability (or reluctance) to exercise veto power over the
young leader. The Kim family’s rule over North Korea, lasting three generations and spanning more than six decades, has
persisted without noticeable political opposition.
However, the smooth power transition to Kim Jong-un is no guarantee of future regime stability. His father’s military-ﬁrst
politicsdclosing the door to the outsideworld andmobilizing the KPA to suppress possible rebelliousmovementsdcannot be
a long-term solution for the poverty-stricken country; if such extreme economic difﬁculties continue, both the people and
eventually the elite will turn against the Kim dynasty. In this respect, the current ruler’s immediate task is to undertake
extensive economic reforms to feed his people. Kim Jong-un’s political priorities should be to implement bold economic
reforms and to restructure political power structures to circumvent the KPA’s political clout. When Kim Jong-un was intro-
duced as the successor to his father, many people expected the son to be more reform-minded and ﬂexible than his father.
Indeed, Kim Jong-un has expressed an interest in foreign trade and direct investment as well as creating special economic
zones in which North Korea and China would jointly venture in areas such as Hwanggeumpyong and Rajin-Seonbong
(Mansourov, 2013). At the same time, he announced a bold agricultural reform, the “June 28 New Economic Management
Measures,” in which the state would collect 70 percent of the production quota and the farmwould have the freedom to keep
any production above the quota and sell on the market at the market prices.
Another important priority for the current Kim regime should be to circumvent the KPA’s political domination. Kim Jong-
un attempted to switch the locus of political power from the KPA to the KWP and the cabinet andweaken themilitary’s role in
economicmanagement. Such restructuring is clearly reﬂected in the April 2013 reshufﬂe of the KWP’s Central Committee: out
of 17 members and 15 alternates of the Committee, only ﬁve members and six alternates are from the military and security
sectors (Madden, 2013). Although it is not yet clear whether Kim Jong-un is willing to abandon his father’s military-ﬁrst
politics, such a deviation might trigger resistance from the KPA and weaken the regime’s power base. Kim Jong-un’s purge
of Ri Young-ho (vice marshal, former member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo, and former vice chairman of the
KWPMilitary Commission) in July 2012 is emblematic of a tension between the cabinet and the military, as Ri and a group of
KPA ofﬁcers opposed transferring the military’s economic management to the cabinet because it was seen as counter to
military-ﬁrst politics.
In this respect, Kim Jong-il’s military-ﬁrst politics may pose greatest challenges to his son’s political and economic reform
agendas. Kim Jong-un’s bold economic reform initiatives during his ﬁrst year has been overshadowed by subsequent military
provocations e the satellite launch in December 2012 and the third nuclear test in February 2013 e that led to UN Security
Council Resolutions for tougher sanctions. While North Korea aims to bring the United States and South Korea to the bar-
gaining table, such confrontational tactics undoubtedly have domestic political purposes. Immediately after the satellite
launch and the nuclear test, North Korea’s newsmedia lauded Kim Jong-un’s leadership and deﬁance of the superpower (Roh,
2013). Such provocative actions and ensuing security crisis situation seriously harmNorth Korea’s economy but bring the rally
effect to the current Kim regime and strengthening of Kim’s political power against the KPA. Undeniably, Kim Jong-un seems
to be concerned more about regime security than economic reforms. In the end, the Kim Jong-un regime’s success or failure
will depend upon an intricate balance between moving away from military-ﬁrst politics and embracing economic reform
while keeping the KPA’s allegiance.
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